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The Emerging Shape of Global Justice: 
Retrogression or Course Correction? 
DIANE ORENTLICHER†  
I am honored to deliver the Gerber lecture, and doubly honored 
to do so along with the venerable Justice Michael Kirby. 
Like many international lawyers, I have had an acute sense of 
whiplash in recent years.  Not that long ago we saw a heady period of 
global institution-building, along with the conclusion of major 
international agreements like the Paris climate agreement and the Iran 
nuclear deal, which tackled critically important issues.  Now, of 
course, the United States has left the Iran deal and set in motion the 
process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; the United 
Kingdom has been mired in the seemingly endless throes of Brexit; 
and two countries have left the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
while others have threatened to do so.1   
As my last example suggests, the whiplash metaphor is surely 
relevant with respect to international criminal justice.  Recent signs of 
retrenchment follow a remarkable expansion of institutions, law, and 
practice in this sphere.  In the space of just one decade: 
• The United Nations (UN) Security Council created two 
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 1.  Burundi and the Philippines have withdrawn from the ICC.  The governments of South 
Africa and The Gambia reversed earlier decisions to withdraw.  See Norimitsu Onishi, South 
Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html; Meritt 
Kennedy, Under New Leader, Gambia Cancels Withdrawal From International Criminal 
Court, NPR (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancels-withdrawal-from-
international-criminal-court. 
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international criminal tribunals,2 both cast in the mold of 
Nuremberg, to prosecute grievous crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively; 
• We saw the advent of a new breed of court, which brought 
together international and national personnel and law, to 
try those most responsible for atrocities in Sierra Leone, 
East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia, and elsewhere; 
• We also saw unprecedented use of universal jurisdiction, 
the principle that allows States to prosecute atrocities 
committed beyond their borders by and against people 
who have no connection to their country except the bond 
of humanity, most famously used to secure the 1998 arrest 
in London of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet at 
the request of a Spanish judge; 
• And, of course, we saw the creation in 2002 of a 
permanent international criminal court with a potentially 
global remit.   
Small wonder proponents of international justice were positively 
giddy in this period, which seemed to herald the beginning of the end 
of the age of impunity.   
No one would describe recent developments in remotely similar 
terms.  Already seven years ago, the Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (JICJ) devoted a symposium issue to “setbacks” in the project 
of international justice.3  Two developments exemplify the wider trend 
the JICJ symposium addressed. 
First, the assertive use of universal jurisdiction, which human 
rights advocates had celebrated when it led to Pinochet’s arrest in 
1998, provoked a forceful backlash, not least from the United States.  
Among other consequences, Belgium and Spain curtailed their 
previously robust use of this principle. 
Second, the ICC drew fire from the African Union (AU) when it 
issued an arrest warrant against Sudan’s then president, Omar al-
Bashir.  In 2010, the AU called on Member States to defy the Court by 
refusing to arrest Bashir, and the next year it endorsed Kenya’s quest 
 
 2. S.C. Res. 827, at 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing tribunal for atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, at 2 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing tribunal for genocide and other 
atrocities in Rwanda). 
 3. Symposium, Recent Setbacks for International Criminal Justice Put into Perspective, 
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 501–570 (2013). 
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to forestall the ICC’s investigation of post-election violence there. A 
number of AU members threatened to leave the ICC, 4 although to date 
only one, Burundi, has followed through.5 
In this setting, I want to raise three questions.  First—and this will 
be the focus of my remarks—To what extent have these and other 
setbacks resulted from the broader populist challenge to the 
international legal order with which this symposium is concerned? 
Second, which of these setbacks should concern us?  Finally, whatever 
their causes, do recent developments in the field of global justice 
presage the end of an era?  Or, instead, do they signify an inevitable, 
and perhaps even constructive, period of mid-course correction? 
Before I take up these questions, it might be helpful to indicate 
what I have in mind when I refer to populist challenges.  As has often 
been noted, there is nothing like a consensus definition of populism, 
and I do not plan to make the case for a particular one here.  My 
remarks will, however, be informed by several aspects of populism as 
it has been defined by some scholars, whose definitions include 
phenomena we can readily recognize even if we do not have a common 
understanding of what adds up to a populist movement. As will be 
clear, each of these characteristics reflects something of a caricature.   
Individuals whom many scholars identify as members of populist 
movements use categories such as race, national origin, ethnicity, 
gender, and religion to exclude groups from their conception of “the 
people.”6  Further, many hold that populists are skeptical of counter-
majoritarian institutions that protect minorities, whether those 
institutions are embedded in national governance structures or are 
international in nature.7  Finally, and perhaps implicit in the two 
preceding points, populist movements are said to be antithetical to the 
liberal values that have grounded support for many international 
institutions, including the ICC.8  It follows from these characteristics 
that, in countries where populist movements have established a 
significant measure of political influence, we would expect to see 
 
 4. See Diane Orentlicher, Owning Justice and Reckoning with Its Complexity, 11 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 521–522 (2013). 
5 See Jina Moore, Burundi Quits International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2017, at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-international-criminal-
court.html. 
 6. See Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 544 (2004). 
 7. William A. Galston, The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 
5, 11 (2018). 
 8. See Erik Voeten, Liberalism, Populism, and the Backlash against International 
Courts, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, June 2019, at 1, 1–2. 
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rising opposition to international courts that protect human rights, 
particularly those of vulnerable minorities, especially when those 
courts take actions likely to mobilize a country’s populist leader and/or 
his political base.   
 So, then, are notable setbacks in the field of international justice 
attributable, at least in substantial part, to a populist backlash?   
In my view, they have fundamentally different origins. To be 
sure, populist perspectives are deeply antithetical to the liberal 
commitments that underpin and sustain global justice, and have 
intensified a process of retrenchment already underway.  It is surely no 
coincidence, for example, that one of the countries that has withdrawn 
from the ICC, the Philippines, is led by a quintessential populist who 
enjoys immense popularity at home despite (if not, at least in part, 
because of) his boastful embrace of extra-judicial executions as a 
means of crime control.9   
Even so, it would be a mistake to suppose ascendant populism is 
one of the principal factors behind setbacks in the field of international 
justice.  What, then, are the chief drivers of this trend? 
First, it is no secret that the ICC’s performance has been 
disappointing.  It took a decade after it began operating for the Court 
to issue its first judgment.10  In several cases the Prosecutor’s evidence 
was so thin the Court declined even to confirm charges; in other 
instances, cases have collapsed at trial or on appeal.11  This inevitably 
dampened enthusiasm for the Court, the foremost emblem of global 
justice, and diminished States’ commitment to it.   
Second, while the Prosecutor bears significant responsibility, 
other factors have contributed to the Court’s disappointing 
performance. Too often, State cooperation with investigations and 
arrests has been sorely lacking except when the Court has investigated 
a government’s opponents, typically in cases sent to the Court by the 
government in question.  This stands in marked contrast to the robust 
and necessary support enjoyed by the two ad hoc tribunals created by 
 
 9. Regine Cabato, Duterte’s Drug War Still Popular Amid Deaths, Controversy, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 27, 2019. 
 10. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04/01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of 
the Statute (Public), (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF. 
 11. See, e.g., Dionne Searcey & Palko Karasz, Laurent Gbagbo, Former Ivory Coast 
Leader, Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/laurent-gbagbo-ivory-coast-icc.html. 
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the Security Council in 1993 and 1994. 
Third, parties to the ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, have been reluctant to finance the 
Court at the level it needs to perform effectively. Compounding this 
problem, the UN Security Council has twice referred situations to the 
Court while refusing to allow the United Nations to fund the 
investigations the Council mandated.12  The resulting mismatch 
between mandate and resources makes it all the more difficult for the 
Prosecutor to conduct effective investigations. 
Fourth, governments of various political stripes—not just those 
falling within a particular range on the ideological spectrum—have 
challenged the ICC, at times aggressively, when it has targeted or 
moved closer to targeting their own leaders and citizens.  This has been 
the case with States that have joined the ICC, like Kenya,13 and States 
that have not, like Sudan and the United States.  This brand of self-
interested opposition is of course standard fare in the wider domain of 
human rights enforcement.   
Also illuminating are the rhetorical terms in which challenges to 
the ICC have been framed.  Three discursive themes have loomed large 
such challenges, none of which I would characterize as fundamentally 
populist. 
One of the most influential narratives holds that the Court is a 
neocolonial institution, dominated by Western countries yet focused 
overwhelmingly on African suspects.  It is not hard to see why this 
charge gained traction.  For more than a dozen years after the ICC 
began operating, all of the Prosecutor’s investigations involved crimes 
committed in African States. 
While this pattern alone might have evoked the charge of 
selective justice, it also frustrated a cherished hope on the part of many 
African citizens and leaders who had embraced the ICC with palpable 
enthusiasm.  Indeed, the African commitment to the ICC was 
astonishing; as has often been noted, the largest regional bloc of States 
parties to the Rome Statute is African.  A key reason is that many 
Africans believed—and were encouraged to believe—that the new 
court would upend the unequal distribution of power that defined the 
postwar international order. As espoused by many of its proponents, 
 
 12. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 8 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 13. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne E. Showalter, Opposing International 
Justice: Kenya’s Integrated Backlash Strategy Against the ICC, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1 
(2017). 
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the ICC promised to treat nationals of all States equally; there would 
be no Great Power exemption from its jurisdiction.14 And so the 
Court’s focus on atrocities committed in small-power States, mostly in 
Africa, defied expectations that had helped garner strong African 
support for the Court. 
A second discursive challenge, which overlaps with and suffuses 
the others but also has independent valence, sounds in sovereignty—
in this context meaning it is each State’s sovereign right to decide 
whom and how to prosecute (or otherwise address) crimes committed 
in its territory and by its nationals.  When, moreover, an international 
court asserts jurisdiction over a country’s head of state, the affront to 
its sovereignty is acute.  Not surprisingly, some of the ICC’s most 
vexed challenges have arisen when its Prosecutor targeted senior 
leaders like then President Bashir of Sudan and the two top leaders of 
Kenya. 
Sovereignty-based challenges to the Court should not surprise us.  
For most of the period often described in terms of the liberal 
international order, the right to prosecute one’s own nationals was seen 
as a basic concomitant of sovereignty.  Think about it: for at least half 
a century, the postwar liberal international order did not include an 
international body that could prosecute individuals, nor was there a 
widespread belief that such a court should exist.  Even today, one can 
readily find accounts of the postwar liberal order that make no mention 
of the ICC or any other international criminal tribunal.15  In a similar 
vein, international law has long held that a State’s courts cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over the incumbent head of state and other senior 
officials of another country, and the contemporary era of global justice 
did not change this.16 
A third thematic challenge to the ICC sounds in American 
exceptionalism.  As espoused by a succession of American leaders, this 
perspective is suffused with notions of sovereignty.  Even so, it makes 
distinctive claims. 
Before I elaborate, it may be helpful to note key corollaries of this 
perspective.  Despite significant changes in U.S. policy toward the ICC 
over time, at no time in the Court’s history has the U.S. government 
 
 14. See William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM JUST. 
545, 548-49 (2013). 
 15. See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order?, 94 INT’L AFF. 
7 (2017). 
 16. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 58 (Feb. 2002). 
6_ORENTLICHER_THE EMERGING SHAPE OF GLOBAL JUSTICE_62.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/21  1:11 PM 
2020] THE EMERGING SHAPE OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 67 
accepted the proposition that the Court could legitimately prosecute 
American nationals.  (Similarly, the United States has opposed efforts 
by other countries, notably including Belgium, to prosecute U.S. 
officials for alleged war crimes.17) 
The U.S. government has often explained its opposition to the 
exercise of ICC jurisdiction over Americans as a logical consequence 
of its status as a non-party to the Rome Statute.  But the more salient 
point is that it is inconceivable the United States would join the Court.  
This follows from two core tenets of American exceptionalism as it 
relates to global justice.  The first holds that the United States has 
assumed paramount responsibility for ensuring the security of the 
postwar liberal international order and bears a correspondingly high 
exposure to risks, including what U.S. officials have often described 
as the risk politically-motivated prosecutions of American citizens and 
leaders.  An article in the New York Times published in September 
2018, when John Bolton was National Security Advisor, captured this 
theme when it summarized Bolton’s hostility toward the ICC: “The 
United States … shoulders many of the West’s [security] duties.  Why 
then, Mr. Bolton and his allies argue, would the United States expose 
its citizens to oversight and second-guessing from nations that have 
benefited from a robust American military?”18   
The second tenet of American exceptionalism as it relates to 
global justice is that the only relevant safeguards for prosecuting U.S. 
citizens are to be found in our constitution, not in the statutes and rules 
of global courts.  Another article published in 2018 captured both of 
these themes when it described the source of American hostility to the 
ICC in terms of “concerns that U.S. soldiers and civilian leaders might 
be put on trial, without U.S. constitutional protections, by an anti-
American prosecutor in a court with non-American judges.”19 
Earlier I intimated that, despite the continuity of American 
exceptionalism as it relates to the ICC, there have been meaningful 
distinctions in ICC policy among different administrations. Brief 
consideration of key shifts in U.S. policy illuminates how the populist 
orientation of President Trump joins up with longstanding sources of 
 
 17. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with 
Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1062 (2004). 
 18. Matt Apuzzo & Marlise Simons, U.S. Attack on I.C.C. Is Seen as Bolstering World’s 
Despots, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/ 
world/europe/icc-burundi-bolton.html. 
 19. Ron Synovitz, Explainer: Why Does the U.S. Have It Out for the International 
Criminal Court?, RFE/RL (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-why-does-u-s-
have-it-out-for-international-criminal-court-/29484529.html. 
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U.S. opposition to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over American 
citizens and, in consequence, poses a heightened challenge to the 
Court. 
As is well known, during the first term of the George W. Bush 
administration the U.S. government was openly hostile to the ICC and 
took aggressive steps to ensure it could not exercise jurisdiction over 
U.S. nationals.  The shift toward a more friendly relationship with the 
Court did not begin when President Obama took office, but rather 
during the second term of the Bush administration.  Early in President 
Bush’s second term, his administration allowed the UN Security 
Council to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, and made 
clear its willingness to support the Prosecutor’s work on that situation. 
President Barack Obama built upon the shift his predecessor 
initiated.  After undertaking an inter-agency review of U.S. policy 
toward the ICC, the Obama administration developed a forward-
leaning relationship with the Court, actively supporting prosecutions 
based on a case-by-case assessment.  Yet at no time did that 
administration contemplate U.S. adherence to the Rome Statute.   
The next administration brought another major shift in policy.  
Although President Trump is no fan of the ICC, his administration did 
not aggressively attack the Court until two developments converged.  
First, Bolton became National Security Advisor.  Second, the ICC 
Prosecutor moved toward announcing whether she would seek to open 
an investigation against Americans, among others, in Afghanistan.20   
Although Bolton has returned to private life, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo has continued to espouse and act upon the policy he 
crafted by, for example, announcing that the ICC prosecutor cannot 
travel within the United States outside New York, and then only for 
official UN business.21 
 
 20. See Owen Bowcott et al., John Bolton Threatens War Crimes Court with Sanctions in 
Virulent Attack, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/sep/10/john-bolton-castigate-icc-washington-speech. 
 21.  See AFP, US to Deny Visas for ICC Members Investigating War Crimes, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/mike-pompeo-us-war-
crimes-investigation-international-criminal-court; see also Patrick Wintour et al., US Revokes 
ICC Prosecutor’s Visa over Afghanistan Inquiry, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/apr/05/us-revokes-visa-of-international-criminal-
courts-top-prosecutor.  More recently—after these remarks were delivered—Pompeo publicly 
attacked by name, and expressed a veiled threat against, two members of the ICC Prosecutor’s 
staff.  See Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Remarks to the Press, Mar. 17, 2020, at 
https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-6/. 
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If the Trump administration’s ICC policy was defined in 
significant part by Bolton, whom I would not characterize as a populist, 
it is now suffused with the populist perspectives of the president.  
Trump has made no secret of his disdain for the principles of 
humanitarian law the ICC enforces; how often has he extolled the good 
old days when you could torture suspects and execute alleged 
traitors?22  And a president who nullifies war crimes convictions 
imposed by U.S. military courts23 would scarcely abide ICC 
proceedings against American nationals. 
In short, the current U.S. stance toward the ICC represents a 
robust version of American exceptionalism, now infused with a strong 
measure of populist sentiment.  This assuredly poses a heightened 
threat to the ICC, already weakened by the confluence of various 
challenges noted earlier.24   
Let me now turn to the other questions I noted at the outset of my 
remarks. First, in a landscape of myriad challenges to the project of 
global justice, which should concern us? 
The short and obvious answer, I believe, is that we should be far 
more worried about developments that threaten the core values of 
human security the ICC’s work is designed to protect than by critiques 
of the Court’s performance.  With respect to the latter, there are 
perfectly legitimate questions to be raised about how well recent 
models of human protection, including international criminal tribunals, 
have worked.  Indeed, it is incumbent on us to ensure that institutions 
designed to protect fundamental rights are working as well as possible. 
In contrast, when President Trump says the United States has no 
reason to worry about a Turkish slaughter of Kurds in Northern Syria 
because “it has nothing to do with us,”25 he strikes at the deepest 
interests of our shared humanity and at the heart of the liberal 
international order in which the United States provided leadership for 
 
 22. See, e.g., Jonathan Swan, Trump Said CIA Director Gina Haspel Agreed with Him 
“100%” on Torture, AXIOS (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/trump-gina-haspel-cia-
torture-waterboarding-f8c4b63b-7825-4cc9-9ff3-128c759f5eee.html. 
 23. Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy’s Decision to Oust SEAL Accused of War 
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-seals-
eddie-gallagher.html. 
 24. Matt Apuzzo & Marlise Simons, U.S. Attack on I.C.C. Is Seen as Bolstering World’s 
Despots, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/world/ 
europe/icc-burundi-bolton.html. 
 25. Peter Baker & Catie Edmondson, Trump Lashes Out on Syria as Republicans Rebuke 
Him in House Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/10/16/world/middleeast/trump-erdogan-turkey-syria-kurds.html. 
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70 years.  And when an American president tells leaders of murderous 
regimes he thinks they are doing a great job,26 that too threatens the 
fragile fabric of global commitment to human rights, and has more far-
reaching repercussions than similar comments from most other 
leaders.   
Let me briefly address the final question I posed earlier: In light 
of myriad challenges I have noted, are we reaching the end of an era 
of global justice?   
Inevitably the fate of this enterprise is tied up with wider 
challenges to human rights posed by populism.  The degree to which 
the sentiments Trump has expressed strike fertile soil elsewhere is 
crucial in this sphere as in many others.  For international justice is 
inextricably linked to a belief in the sanctity of every human life and 
recognition of a global responsibility to protect vulnerable individuals 
from grave harm.    
The success of international justice is also tightly linked to the 
ability of civil society actors to advocate and organize.27  Yet an 
alarming feature of the emerging global landscape—in particular, 
resurgent nationalism—is that the space for such advocacy has not 
only shrunk but closed in many countries.28 
Despite these challenges, which are very serious indeed, I believe 
the core enterprise of global justice has a promising future.  But it 
needs a robust process of course correction to remain viable.   
To the first point, while my previous remarks focused on 
challenges to core aspects and institutions of international justice, the 
demand for justice remains powerful.  National Public Radio (NPR) 
recently aired an interview with a young man who survived brutal 
torture in Syria, Omar Alshogre, and lost his father, brothers and 
cousins to the ruthless practices of the Assad regime.  Now in Sweden, 
Alshogre devotes his life to laying the groundwork for an eventual 
reckoning.  As NPR reporter Deborah Amos put it, “his faith in justice 
 
 26.  Scott Simon, Opinion: A President in Praise of Strongmen and Dictators, NPR (Oct. 
20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/659024594/opinion-a-president-in-praise-of-
strongmen-and-dictators. 
 27. Cf.  Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash against International Courts in West, East and 
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 293, 321–22 (2016) 
(identifying key role of civil society mobilization in containing backlashes against 
international courts that are not criminal in nature). 
 28. See Hilal Tekmen, Populism and Closing Civic Space: A Post-Truth Challenge, 16 
TURKISH POL’Y Q. 105, 109 (June 16, 2017). 
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keeps him going.”29  I have seen the same determination to ensure 
justice, however long it takes, in many places where the pillars of 
human protection have collapsed. 
The mobilization of victims has produced truly remarkable 
milestones even as the most visible institution of global justice, the 
ICC, has at times faltered.  Think of the prosecution of former Chadian 
dictator Hissène Habré in Senegal: Survivors of his ruthless crimes 
pursued justice for a quarter century before they found justice in an 
extraordinary court. 
Much the same determination has led to groundbreaking 
prosecutions before national courts exercising universal jurisdiction 
despite the previously-noted backlash against some countries’ use of 
this principle.30 
As for the ICC, there is important work now underway that 
explores how the Court can be retooled not only to conduct more 
successful investigations and prosecutions itself, but also to better 
answer the needs of victims in the places they live.  The crucial idea 
behind much of this work involves reorienting the Court to do 
something many of its supporters have long claimed it should do—
incentivizing and empowering domestic prosecutors and other actors 
to bring justice home, where it is most desperately needed.31 
*** 
In closing, the model of global justice that emerged in the 1990s 
is now reeling from multiple blows, whose origins lie largely outside 
the province of ascendant populism but which now draw strength from 
it.  For the most part those challenges are manageable—more so, I 
believe, than other fundamental threats posed by contemporary 
manifestations of populism.   
 
 29. Deborah Amos, Survivor of Torture in Syria’s Prisons Is Telling His Story, NPR 
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/24/763679511/survivor-of-torture-in-syrias-
prisons-is-telling-his-story. 
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To meet these challenges, human rights advocates and other key 
actors will have to regroup, reconsider strategies and models in which 
they have heavily invested, forge new alliances, and innovate, all while 
keeping firmly in sight the urgent claims of our common humanity. 
 
